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CASENOTE
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster-The Supreme
Court's Balancing Act Between the Risks of Third-Party
Liability for Copyright Infringement and Rewards of
Innovation
Karen M. Kramert
INTRODUCTION
The decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) pitted the movie and music industries, owners
of copyrighted works, against several defendants whose business
model is to promote free trading of unlicensed works on the Internet.
The decision revisited standards of third-party liability for copyright
infringement by technology providers who enable sharing of
unlicensed works among end users-a process decried by copyright
owners as piracy. The direct trading of unlicensed, copyrighted
material among end-users is known as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing.
Although the High Court ruled in favor of the copyright owners, the
decision considered and addressed a number of competing interests.
The broader issue at stake in Grokster involves the scope of liability
for technology innovators whose technology may be used for both
infringing activities and noninfringing uses. In other words, where
should the line be drawn between the risk of liability and the reward
for innovation?
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at The Washington Post, in-house at the Recording Industry Association of America, and as an
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the D.C. office. Thanks to the following interested parties to the litigation who shared their
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Audible Magic. The views expressed in this article are my own and do not represent any of
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The seed of this debate began twenty years ago in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), when the
Supreme Court announced a doctrine protecting innovators whose
technology can be used for infringing and noninfringing uses. That
case concerned the manufacturer of the Betamax. In short, the Sony
defense immunized manufacturers against third-party liability for
copyright infringement when the technology at issue could be used
for both legitimate and infringing purposes. However, ambiguities in
how the circuit courts interpreted Sony in P2P cases during the past
five years led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Grokster.
The technology provided by the Grokster defendants, known to
the public as KaZaa, FastTrack, and Morpheus, represented the next
wave of P2P technology after Napster. In July 2001, the Ninth
Circuit famously slapped Napster, the company that facilitated free
sharing of songs electronically over the Internet, with liability for
massive infringement by end-users. 1 Shortly thereafter, the original
Napster folded,2 and new forms of P2P technology emerged in its
place. Like Napster, the Grokster defendants offered file sharing for
free. However, the Ninth Circuit found the more decentralized
technology at issue in Grokster a fundamental difference from the
architecture at issue in Napster. The Ninth Circuit declined to impose
liability based on this key technological difference, concluding, ipso
facto, and despite record evidence to the contrary, that the Grokster
defendants lacked control over the infringing activity on their
network. 3
In a previously published article in this journal, I argued that the
Ninth Circuit inappropriately discounted abundant evidence of intent
to facilitate infringement: the article concluded, "[riestoring some
1. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. After folding, the original Napster then sold its name at a bankruptcy auction of a
subscription-based online music provider. See Amy Harmon, Deal May Raise Napsterfrom
Online Ashes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at C 1; Jon Healey, Roxio Sells Software Unit, Bets on
Napster, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at C2.
3. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir.
2004). The Ninth Circuit went so far as to adopt the district court's findings that "even if the
Software Distributors 'closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control,
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption."' (quoting
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal.
2003). This finding was questionable on a record of summary judgment, when the copyright
owners in fact presented evidence to the contrary. For example, the defendants had the capacity
to filter unlicensed works, since they already filtered viruses and the technology defendants'
networks involved ongoing support and maintenance, rather than a one-time sale. See Petition
For Writ of Certiorari at 18, 27, 28, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125
S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).
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focus on the intent of the actors involved makes eminent sense in
sorting out contributory infringement liability in the post-Napster
world."'4 I also argued that the Ninth Circuit placed too much
emphasis on the decentralized structure of technology in assessing
whether to impose third-party liability for copyright infringement,
wrongly elevating the format of a technology over the intent of the
inventors. 5 The Supreme Court's opinion embraced precisely those
points. However, it did so without redefining any of the parameters
of the Sony defense, as the interested public had anticipated.
Instead, the Supreme Court unanimously found liability based on
a theory of "inducement"-a concept borrowed from patent and
common law, in which evidence of intent to facilitate infringement is
paramount. At the same time, the High Court unanimously declined
to further clarify the triggering point for Sony's immunity from
liability for copyright infringement by third parties. The ruling
presented the inducement theory as if it were entirely disjoined from
the Sony defense.
In this article, I argue that the Supreme Court struck far more of
a balance among competing interests than the 9-0 ruling reversing
summary judgment for the technology providers suggests at first
blush. I highlight how the court's treatment of certain issues, such as
the obligation to use filtering technology or to reconfigure software to
minimize infringement, affects various interested parties. In addition,
I posit a way to tie together the Sony defense with the inducement
theory, so that the analysis can be streamlined in future cases. In
short, I propose treating Sony as a qualified privilege that can be
defeated by evidence of intentional encouragement of infringement,
the same evidence that supports an inducement claim.
Part I of this article discusses the legal landscape that provided
the backdrop for the decision. It summarizes the positions advocated
by the parties to the lawsuit and amicus curiae affected by the ruling.
Part II explains the competing interests of the parties to this lawsuit
and others in the technology community. Part III explains the Court's
ruling and important issues the Court declined to address. Finally,
Part IV offers predictions for the impact of this decision in the world
of digital music and movie file sharing and other applications of P2P
file sharing. It also posits a theory for connecting the Sony defense to
4. Karen M. Kramer, Intent: The Road Not Taken in the Ninth Circuit's Post-Napster
Analysis of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L. J. 525, 542 (2005).
5. Id. at 528.
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the inducement theory of liability in a seamless, 2-step analysis. A
close look at the Court's treatment of intent furnishes a basis for
proposing that courts treat Sony as a qualified privilege, which can be
defeated by the same type of evidence that also supports an
inducement claim.
I. THE BACKDROP OF THE DECISION
Historically, third-party liability for copyright infringement has
taken one of two forms. The first, contributory copyright
infringement, requires proof of: (1) knowledge of infringing activity,
and (2) material contribution to it.6 An outgrowth of respondeat
superior, the second, vicarious copyright infringement, requires a
showing that the defendant: (1) has a right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity, and (2) has a direct financial interest in the
infringing activity. 7 The bulk of the analysis in Grokster concerned
contributory copyright infringement. However, by importing the
issue of knowledge from contributory infringement analysis into
vicarious infringement analysis's concern with control, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Grokster, to a large extent, conflated the two. 8
The movie and music industries brought suit against Grokster
and other technology innovators whose facilitation of trade in
unlicensed works the industries claimed caused losses of between
$700 million and several billion dollars annually.9 The technology
used by the Grokster defendants-known to the public as KaZaa,
FastTrack, and Morpheus--offered downloading of music and movies
for free. The defendants profited by selling advertisements on the
website used by file sharers. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the copyright owners in Grokster contended that 90% of
the material traded over the defendants' networks constituted
infringing, unlicensed material. 10
In contrast to the Grokster defendants, a number of fledgling
businesses have been offering licensed music and movies for a fee.
For example, Apple's iTunes stands out as the most well known fee-
based product. It offers songs for 99 cents that can be played on
portable music players, such as iPods. More than half a dozen other
fledgling businesses offer some form of digital downloading of
6. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
7. Id. at 1022.
8. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 536 n.74.
9. Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 29, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).
10. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
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licensed movies and music for a fee to end-users. 1' Thus, the
technology providers in Grokster seek to profit by offering unlicensed
material for free, raking in revenue through advertisements
proportional to the amount of infringing user activity, in contrast to
the emerging licensed-based services. 12
A. The Sony Betamax Decision
The path to the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster began
twenty years ago, in the context of home video tape recorders. In
Sony, the Supreme Court grappled with the issue of liability for
technology that is capable of being used for both infringing and
noninfringing purposes. The Supreme Court determined that the sale
of video tape recorders did not constitute contributory infringement.
Video tape recorders were primarily used to "time-shift," or watch a
show at a later time, which the Court determined to be noninfringing
under the doctrine of fair use. 13 In light of this noninflinging use, the
High Court held that the manufacturer of Betamax was not liable for
contributory infringement based upon customers' infringing uses of
that technology. The Court referred to this protection as the "staple
article of commerce doctrine," which it borrowed from patent law. 14
However, the Supreme Court inconsistently expressed when the
protection should apply, setting the stage for later confusion seen in
Grokster. In one passage, the Court suggested that the technology
owner need only show the capacity of its equipment to be used for a
noninfringing purpose in order to be protected. 15 In another passage,
the Court suggested that the noninfringing uses must be "substantial
and commercially significant" to trigger protection from contributory
infringement claims. 16 Depending on how the language in Sony is
parsed, a nominal or strong showing of legitimate, noninfringing uses
will trigger protection from liability for contributory infringement.
11. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 530-31.
12. For a fuller discussion of the marketplace of emerging license-based businesses, see
id. at 527-31.
13. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421, 443 (1984).
14. Id. at 440 ("The [Patent] Act expressly provides that the sale of a 'staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use' is not contributory
infringement." (citing 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(c) (2005))).
15. Id. at 442 ("Indeed, [the product] need merely be capable of substantial non infringing
uses [to merit protection]." (emphasis added)); id. ("[O]ne potential use of the Betamax plainly
satisfies this standard .... (emphasis added)).
16. See, e.g., id. at 442 (holding that there is no contributory infringement where the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable businesses); id. ("The question is thus
whether Betamax is capable of commercial significant noninfringing uses." (emphasis added)).
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That ambiguity left room for courts to apply the protection of Sony
differently in the context of assessing liability in a trio of cases
involving movie and music file sharing.
B. Napster, Grokster and A imster
In the wake of Sony, a trio of circuit court cases spawned
disagreements over the scope of Sony's protection for innovative
technology that may be used for both infringing and noninfringing
purposes: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,17 Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios v. Grokster,18 and In re Aimster Copyright Litig.19
This section describes the key holdings in each of these cases and
how they came to the forefront in the High Court's ruling in Grokster.
1. Napster
Napster, the company that once facilitated free sharing of songs
electronically over the Internet, raised the public's consciousness of
the power of P2P file sharing. In Napster, however, the Sony decision
played only a minor role.
To the Ninth Circuit in Napster, Sony simply meant that
knowledge of copyright infringement would not be imputed to
Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be
used for that purpose.20 The court instead imposed liability on
Napster based on evidence of Napster's actual and constructive
knowledge of infringement. Evidence of the actual knowledge
credited by the District Court included:
" A document authored by a co-founder of Napster
mentioning the need to remain ignorant of users' real
names and IP addresses "since they are exchanging
pirated music"; and
* notice by the Recording Industry Association to Napster
about 12,000 infringing files. 21
Evidence of constructive knowledge included Napster's
promotion of the site with screen shots of infringing files. 22 The
Ninth Circuit held that by "learn[ing] of specific infringing material
17. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
18. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
19. In re Aimster Copyright Litig,, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
20. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
21. Id. at 1020 n.5.
22. Id.
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and fail[ing] to purge such material from the system," Napster had the
type of knowledge required for liability. 23
The court found "material contribution" to the infringement as
well. By providing the site and facilities for infringement, Napster
materially contributed to the infringing activity. 24 Knowledge and
intent to profit or facilitate infringement merged together to form a
basis for the decision to grant an injunction in favor of the copyright
holders, famously shutting down Napster as the free file sharing
service. 25
2. Grokster
The Ninth Circuit veered sharply from its analysis in Napster in
the Grokster decision. Granting summary judgment to the defendant
technology providers, the Ninth Circuit applied a heightened
knowledge requirement that must be satisfied before liability could be
imposed and be deemed outside Sony's zone of protection. Unlike
Napster, in Grokster the court ruled that copyright owners must have
"specific knowledge of infringement at [the] time which they
contribute[d] to the infringement and failed to act upon that
information." 26
The Ninth Circuit in Grokster narrowly focused on the
differences in the structure of the technology used by the Grokster
defendants, in contrast to that used by Napster. Napster employed a
central server, which contained an index of all songs traded on the
network; all exchange of material occurred through this central
index. 27 The Grokster defendants used a mix of semi-centralized and
decentralized systems.28
In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this more
decentralized technology precluded a finding of knowledge of or
control over infringement. Moreover, the court discounted evidence
of active intent to facilitate infringement, including:
23. Id. at 1021.
24. Id. at 1022.
25. See supra note 2. After the ruling, the original Napster folded and sold its name at a
bankruptcy auction to what is now a subscription, license-based business.
26. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (internal quotations omitted).
27. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-13 (providing a detailed description of Napster's
architecture).
28. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158-59. Under a semi-centralized system, the system
designates certain computers as supemodes that serve as the indexing servers. Under the
decentralized system, each user maintains her own index of files available for sharing.
2005)
176 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
* Thousands of notices of infringement that identified
millions of infringing files and the names of users
distributing them, 29
" the defendants' purposeful reengineering of the system
after the onset of the lawsuit to discontinue login and
registration information, 30 and
* the defendants marketing of themselves as the next
Napster or Alternative to Napster Network - an effort to
capitalize on Napster's reputation for providing licensed
music free of charge.31
3. Aimster
Aimster also involved a lawsuit against a free file swapping
service. The technology at issue involved a centralized system
similar to Napster, although the nature of the technology did not
factor heavily into the court's reasoning. In his opinion, Judge Posner
posited that Sony should be understood as providing a balancing
approach: the court should weigh the magnitude of the harms of
infringement against the value of the technology. 32 In particular, the
Seventh Circuit condemned the defendant's "[w]illful blindness" as a
form of actionable knowledge of infringing activity. 33 The Seventh
Circuit analogized the technology at issue to aiding and abetting
copyright infringement. 34 In contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Grokster,
the Aimster decision held that the defendant's ability to engineer a
program differently to prevent customers from infringing "is a factor
to be considered" in determining a defendant's liability for infringing
uses of its product. 35 In that case, an encryption feature used by the
defendant to hide songs being copied by users of the system
evidenced "willful blindness," which the court equated with
knowledge of infringing activity. 36
29. See MGM Plaintiffs-Appellants Opening Brief at 28, Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (Nos.
03-55894 & 03-56236).
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649-50.
33. Id. at 650.
34. Id. at 651.
35. Id. at 648-49.
36. Id. at 650.
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II. COMPETING INTERESTS
The entire purpose of copyright law, as noted in the Sony
decision, is to strike a balance between a creator's incentive for
reward and the public's benefit in receiving the information. 37 The
litigants hotly contested how the balance should be struck. Numerous
amici briefs weighed in on the topic. This section summarizes the
positions advocated by the parties to the suit as well as other
technology providers who would be directly affected by the lawsuit.
These parties differed over how certain factors should be weighed in
assessing liability, in particular: feasibility of alternative design
structures to minimize infringement, the purpose of the technology,
profit motive, and the role of the technology provider in offering
technical support. Understanding the standpoints promoted by the
parties, with their competing interests, lays the foundation for
appreciating the balance struck by the final ruling in Grokster.
A. Copyright Owners
The copyright owners argued that the Ninth Circuit imposed too
high of a burden for imposing liability. They argued that the dual
requirements of knowledge and ability to stop infringing activity at
the time of its occurrence were unprecedented. 38 Allowing immunity
under Sony when technology has the capacity to be used for
noninfringing purposes, copyright owners argued, set too a low
standard for copyright protection. 39 They repeatedly argued that the
Sony defense should not apply where a product or service is
"primarily used for infringement."'4 0  The copyright owners also
pointed to the mass of evidence demonstrating obvious intent to
facilitate infringement on the part of the technology defendants - an
emphasis that both contributed to the atmospherics and established a
basis for liability on a theory that defendants engaged in conduct that
induces, "encourages or assists infringement."'4 1
The copyright owners pointed to the defendants' profit motive
and ongoing role in providing maintenance and support as factors
37. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
38. Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 19, Grokster,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).
39. Id.
40. Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners at 27-29, 31-32,
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).
41. See id. at 7-12, 19.
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supporting liability for infringement. 42 In addition, the copyright
owners argued that the Grokster defendants had methods in place for
policing infringement that they chose not to employ. As examples,
they pointed first to the fact that defendants already had filters for
viruses, which could be used to filter trading of unlicensed works.43
Second, copyright owners also emphasized the manner in which the
defendants had disabled its login system after the onset of the lawsuit,
a mechanism that could also have been used to help police
infringement. 44 Moreover, the copyright owners argued that the
defendants' use of encryption and anonymity made the users feel safe
to infringe. 45
B. The Defendant Technology Providers
In their merits briefs, the defendant technology providers argued
that Sony should be interpreted broadly as offering protection
whenever a product is "capable of noninfringing uses."'46  The
defendants further claimed that inquiry into the profit motive might
unduly discourage investment in products. 47 "To condemn a profit
motive would, in fact, paralyze investment in any product with
potential infringing uses," they reasoned.48 Furthermore, defendants
resisted an interpretation that would inquire into whether a product
may be configured or redesigned to reduce infringement. 49
Defendants argued against an inquiry into ability to redesign to reduce
infringement, because they believed such an inquiry would stifle
innovation: "Anyone contemplating a new product, or investing in the
development of one, would face the real prospect that one or more
copyright owner[s] ... would sue.., over how the product might
have been designed differently." 50  The technology providers also
unsuccessfully maintained that claims of infringement based on
specific acts of inducement were not before the court. 51
42. See, e.g., id at 44, 46; id at 26.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 25-26.
45. Id. at 25.
46. Brief for Grokster and Streamcast Respondents at 27, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No.
04-480).
47. Id. at 29.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Id. at 30-31.
51. Id. at 33-34.
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C. Other Technology Providers and Interest Groups
A coalition of representatives of other key technology providers
of content, including Google, Yahoo!, Apple Computer, and
Microsoft, filed an amicus brief setting forth their own opinion of the
balance that should be struck between fostering technological
innovation and protecting intellectual property. This brief contended
that the Ninth Circuit's analysis erred by focusing on knowledge
instead of conduct. 52 However, at the other extreme, the Seventh
Circuit's balancing approach in Aimster would disproportionately
favor copyright owners, unless the amount of infringement
approximated zero, they argued. 53 Without articulating a specific
standard, this group thought that mere knowledge of potential or
actual infringement should be insufficient to constitute liability. The
group also advocated that, to avoid chilling the creative process,
certain factors should not be weighed in assessing infringement: (1)
whether a company profits indirectly from infringing use, (2) the
purpose for which the technology was designed or created, (3) the
mere fact that a vendor maintains an ongoing relationship with
infringers by providing customer support for the technology, and (4)
design decisions (e.g., reconfiguration to protect a user's
anonymity).54
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING
Although in one sense the Supreme Court handed the copyright
owners a decisive victory by unanimously reversing summary
judgment in favor of the technology providers, other aspects of the
Court's decision actually favored the interests of other affected
constituencies, such as technology innovators.
A. The Inducement Theory
First and foremost, the High Court agreed with the copyright
owners that the defendant technology companies had acted
egregiously, "with a purpose to cause copyright violations by use of
software suitable for illegal use."'55 The High Court distinguished the
intent to facilitate infringement on the part of these technology
52. Brief of Digital Media Ass'n, NetCoalition, Center for Democracy and Technology
Ass'n of Am. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 20-22, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764
(No. 04-480).
53. Id. at 22-25.
54. Id. at 16-19.
55. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781.
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providers from the intentions of the manufacturer and distributor of
the Betamax. The Court wrapped these concerns into a theory of
liability based on inducement. In particular, the Supreme Court
pointed to three indicia of culpable intent:
1) Each company courted copyright infringers as its
market, often making references in internal documents
and advertising to Napster.56
2) No parties attempted to develop filtering tools or other
mechanisms to diminish infringement; the Supreme
Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to
dismiss such evidence as irrelevant. 57
3) The technology providers derived advertising revenue
from the high volume of infringing use.58
Based on these three factors, the Court concluded, "[T]he
unlawful objective [was] unmistakable" and actionable under a
common law theory of inducement. 59  This evidence of intent
satisfied the standard for inducement of infringement for purposes of
summary judgment.60
Later in the opinion, the Court shed some light on the standard
for satisfying the inducement theory in other cases. "If liability for
inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on the basis
of presuming or imputing fault, but from.., statements and actions"
showing an illegal objective. 61 Third-party liability for copyright
infringement could be found based on "clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement. '62
The Supreme Court imported the theory of inducement of
copyright infringement from patent law, much as it had derived the
original Sony defense from the "staple article of commerce" doctrine
grafted from patent law.63 Essentially, the Court gave a name to and
blessed a doctrine for capturing the issue of intent and the alleged bad
acts encouraging infringing activity, such as those evidenced by the
Grokster defendants. 64 Unlike in Sony, where the primary purpose of
the Betamax was time-shifting or fair use, here the Court found that
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2782.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2770.
63. Id. at 2779 n.l0.
64. Id. at 2782.
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the main function of the product at issue was to assist in infringing
activity. In support of this, the copyright owners had submitted
abundant evidence of statements and actions demonstrating intent to
facilitate infringement. 65
B. The Sony Defense
Ironically, the majority failed to reach consensus in clarifying the
many aspects of the Sony decision that led Grokster to the High Court
in the first place. Perhaps most notably, Sony remains a viable
defense, as acknowledged in the majority opinion authored by Justice
Souter:
We do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more
quantified description of the point of balance between protection
and commerce .... It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's
judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and leave
further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be
required.66
However, in two separate concurring opinions, Justices split over
whether Sony should be interpreted more narrowly, as advocated by
the copyright owners, or more broadly, as advocated by the
technology providers.67 Justices Breyer, Stevens, and O'Connor
would have found the Sony protection satisfied on the record before
the Ninth Circuit, thereby precluding a finding of contributory
copyright infringement, although liability would still have been found
under the inducement theory. 68 These Justices gave great weight to
the wording in Sony that a product need only be "'capable of
substantial noninfringing use."'69 They found an adequate record of
"significant future market for noninfringing uses of Grokster-type-
peer-to-peer software."' 70
Yet Justice Ginsburg, the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy
ruled that the Ninth Circuit should have interpreted the Sony defense
more narrowly and therefore not ruled out claims of contributory
copyright infringement on a motion for summary judgment.71 These
Justices favored the language in Sony requiring proof of "a reasonable
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2778-79.
67. See supra notes 39-54.
68. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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prospect that substantial or commercially significant noninfringing
uses were likely to develop. ' 72 They found this standard not satisfied
based on the record developed in the case.
Thus, the exact permutations of the Sony defense-and therefore
its ramifications for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement-remain open questions.73
IV. THE HIGH TECH, HIGH WIRE BALANCING ACT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court's ruling truly resembled a balancing act.
The copyright holders did not get everything they sought, nor did the
precedent leave P2P users and technology providers without
meaningful alternatives. Part A of this section discusses how the
High Court resolved particularly sensitive issues and sets forth
predictions on how this will affect the future of P2P file sharing and
related e-commerce. Part B of this section proposes a method for
harmonizing the inducement rule and the Sony doctrine. Although the
Court purported to leave Sony intact and distinct from the inducement
theory, the two concepts nevertheless remain entangled in parts of the
Court's analysis. This section argues that, consistent with the Court's
ruling in Grokster, Sony can be viewed as a qualified privilege. That
qualified privilege can be defeated by evidence of culpable intent or
inducement.
A. The Balances Struck and Predictions About Their Effect
In finding inducement as the more viable basis for liability, the
High Court effectively focused on the actions and expressions of
intent of the technology providers. In so doing, the High Court
condemned what it considered bad conduct, rather than bad
technology. This approach has several implications.
A ruling of this nature gives the music and entertainment
industry a powerful sword to pierce and destroy commercial entities
that promote trading of infringing material. Thus, the next Grokster
that seeks to profit from massive trading of unlicensed works does so
at great peril. This threat of liability will allow the fledgling,
licensed-based businesses, such as Apple's iTunes, RealNetworks'
Rhapsody, Microsoft's MSN music, and Music Match, to compete
72. Id. at 2786.
73. Id. at 2782.
THE GROKSTER BALANCING ACT
more fairly in the market. 74 At the same time, hosts of open-source
P2P file sharing technologies that do not redound to the profit of any
commercial entity remain available options for end-users sufficiently
sophisticated to use the technology. 75 Many of those open source
codes are unbranded and thus may not attract a large following. One
notable exception is BitTorrent, a popular open source code
technology that is used for file sharing without profit to its inventor.76
Its founder, Brain Cohen, does not charge any fee for this service,
although he has recently started to accept donations on his site. 77
The music and movie industries may benefit from a reduction in
trade of unlicensed material, simply because of the Supreme Court's
denunciation of the trading of unlicensed material. While some
people may always want to get something for free, plenty of others
may feel that they would rather pay a nominal fee for materials and be
safe from potential wrongdoing or liability. On the other hand, to
have an impact on the segment of dedicated file-swappers whose
attitudes remain impervious to change, the music and movie
industries may feel greater pressure to pursue individual end-users of
open source P2P technologies. 78
Although the High Court focused on actions rather than
technology, it struck a nerve for many parties in addressing the issue
of filtering and design configuration. The High Court ruled that one
factor evidencing culpable intent on the part of the technology
providers was that "neither party attempted to develop filtering tools
or other mechanisms to diminish infringing activity using their
software."'79 One of the amicus briefs, submitted in support of neither
party, attested to the viability of filtering tools and digital
watermarking to help prevent infringement. 80 The Court's statement
could be read as a mandate for innovators to consider infringing uses
and investigate prevention methods. However, in footnote twelve, the
74. See Kramer, supra note 4, 530-31 (describing some of the fledgling, license-based
businesses).
75. See SourceForge, http://www.sourceforge.net (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) for a list of
hundreds of open source options that facilitate P2P file sharing.
76. See Seth Schiesel, File Sharing's New Face, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at G 1.
77. Id.
78. Both the music and movie industries have instituted an aggressive, ongoing campaign
of suing infringers directly. See, e.g., David McGuire, Studios Step Up Fight Against Online
Piracy, Washingtonpost.com, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A63900-2004Dec 14.html.
79. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781.
80. See Brief Amici Curiae of Audible Magic Corp., Digimarc Corp., and Gracenote in
Support of Neither Party, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).
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High Court backed away from such a mandate, stating that "failure to
take affirmative steps to prevent infringement," in the absence of
other evidence of intent, would be an insufficient basis for liability, as
it would "tread too close to the Sony safe harbor."'81
Accordingly, the degree of obligation on the part of software
technology providers to implement design measures, such as filtering,
can be expected to be debated heavily in subsequent decisions. The
High Court's stance on this subject ultimately remained wishy-washy:
coupled with other evidence of bad intent, the obligation to minimize
infringement is strong. Yet in isolation, the mere failure to implement
filtering or other mechanisms to reduce infringement cannot serve as
a basis for liability. It seems likely that the Supreme Court in
Grokster took the technology providers to task in part because the
companies allegedly had in place mechanisms to filter out unwanted
material like viruses, which, according to the copyright owners, could
have also been used to stop infringing activity. 82 The technology
providers also disabled login and user information that could have
allowed tracking of user activity and to police infringing activities. 83
In the Supreme Court's mind, these defendants were "bad actors," and
their resistance to reconfiguring design to minimize infringement
further evidenced this point.
The High Court's ruling minimized the risk of liability for a
technology provider who merely provides ongoing technical support
that may be used for infringing purposes. "Mere knowledge of
infringing [activity], potential or actual infringing [activities]" would
not be enough to impose liability.84 "Nor would ordinary acts
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical
support or product updates, support liability themselves. '85 Thus, on
the question of weight assigned to technical support, the High Court's
ruling discounted the argument of the copyright owners in favor of
other interested parties.
On the issue of profit, the High Court squarely sided with
copyright owners over the defendants and other affected technology
providers in assessing how this factor should be weighed: "Here,
evidence of the distributors' words and deeds going beyond
81. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781 n.12.
82. See Brief For Motion Pictures Studio and Recording Co. Petitioners, supra note 38, at
9-12.
83. See id.
84. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
85. Id.
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distribution as such shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-
party acts of copyright infringement." 86
The High Court's decision also provides some guidance to
content providers like Yahoo! and Google who would like to enter the
market for distribution of movies, music, and books. Recently,
Yahoo! introduced a fee-based music service. 87 Google introduced a
controversial tool for searching whole books that have been scanned
without a license. 88  The safe harbor provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provide a certain amount of
protection to Internet Service Providers like Yahoo! and Google. 89
However, the more they partner with and profit from digital media
sharing materials, the more they too will be affected by the
implications of Grokster.
B. Linking Sony and Inducement into a 2-Step Analysis
Undoubtedly to the relief of many in the technology P2P
communities, the High Court did not eviscerate Sony protections.
However, the failure to clarify its scope will continue to create some
controversy in the courts. In fact, one set of amicus briefs filed by
law professors argued that "the only thing worse than striking a
wrong balance between [innovation and free access to materials]
is... leaving them without a clear idea of the standards that govern
their relationship." 90  Although the Supreme Court declined to
directly address the impact of its decision on Sony, its discussion of
intent at various points inevitably implicated Sony. 91
It seems unnecessarily fractured to talk about the Sony defense to
third-party liability of infringement on one hand, and liability for
inducement on the other. One way of harmonizing these theories is to
view Sony (however defined) as a qualified privilege to create
technology that may be used for both infringing and noninfringing
86. Id. at 2782 (emphasis added).
87. Jon Healy, Yahoo Offers Subscription Service for Online Music, L.A. TIMES, May 11,
2005, at Al.
88. See Burt Helm and Hardy Green, Google This: "Copyright Law" The search giant's
plans to scan whole books have publishers steaming, BUSINESS WEEK, June 6, 2005.
89. 17 U.S.C. §512.
90. Brief In Support of Issuance of Writ of Certiorari by Amici Curiae Law Professors at
7, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).
91. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782; For example, the Court wrote, "in the absence of
other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability
merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device
otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close
to the Sony safe harbor." Id. at 2781 n.12.
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purposes. It presumptively immunizes technology innovators from
liability for infringing uses of technology that are sometimes
unforeseen or secondary to the purpose of the invention. Such a
privilege may be overcome by a showing of bad intent, or what the
High Court defined as "clear expression" or "other affirmative steps"
taken to foster infringement" 92 that the court wrapped in the label of
"inducement."
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's embrace of the inducement doctrine
introduces a method for capturing and weighing evidence of intent to
facilitate infringement. Although a seemingly strong victory for the
copyright owners, the High Court's ruling in fact struck a balance on
issues such as the design decisions and import of ongoing technical
support. The weight assigned to profit and marketing efforts in
assessing liability will be a useful tool for the music and movie
industries' battle against those companies seeking to profit from
facilitating free trading of unlicensed material. Furthermore, it will
even the playing field for emerging, licensed based businesses. The
language encouraging filtering and design configuration to minimize
infringement will likely increase the market for these anti-piracy
technologies, to the point where their usage may become the norm.
However, the ruling will still leave open channels for P2P exchanges
of unlicensed material through open source mechanisms uncontrolled
by a profit-driven, commercial entity. By declining to officially rule
on the permutations of Sony, the Court left the lower courts to choose
varying standards. This article's proposed rule of treating Sony as a
qualified defense could facilitate less fractured analyses in cases to
come.
92. See idat 2770, 2782.
